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Damien Wright. Churchill’s Secret War with Lenin: British and
Commonwealth Military Intervention in the Russian Civil War,
1918-20. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2017. Pp. 576.
Among the cemeteries managed by the Commonwealth War Graves
Commission is the Archangel Allied Cemetery in Archangel, Russia.
Though it is the final resting place of British and Commonwealth
servicemen who died during both the First and Second World Wars, the
overwhelming majority of the graves located there are those of men who
perished fighting the forces of the Red Army during the Russian Civil
War. Its “forlorn and overgrown” condition today (in author Damien
Wright’s words) serves as a sadly appropriate metaphor for the popular
awareness of the role British and Commonwealth forces played in that
conflict (p. 298). Before the war between the Soviet Union and the
West went cold, they served as part of a multinational effort to support
the anti-Bolshevik Whites in their failed attempt to topple the Soviet
regime in Moscow. Yet today their efforts often go unremembered in
the West in the story of Russia’s relations with the outside world.
According to Wright, this was by design. As he sees it, “[t]he
British government attempted to cover up its military involvement
in Russia, 1918-20 by classifying official documents relating to the
campaign under the ‘50 year rule’”(p. 298). This statement may come
as a surprise to some readers, considering that the fifty-year rule was
applied to nearly all internal state documents in Britain at that time,
not just those relating to the intervention in the Russian Civil War.
Like the cemetery in Archangel containing the graves of men who
died fighting in it, the popular ignorance of the intervention has more
to do with benign neglect than any official effort to erase it from the
public imagination. Nevertheless, this attitude is key to understanding
Wright’s goal of chronicling the service of the military personnel of
the British Commonwealth who were stationed in Russia between
1918 and 1921. His book is very much a ground-level account of the
men in uniform, as Wright focuses on the activities of the soldiers,
sailors, and airmen engaged in the various campaigns against the
Soviet regime. Given the considerable geographical scope of the war,
he divides his coverage of the operations by each of the theatres where
the men were deployed; though an understandable way of addressing
the often quite separate efforts of the forces involved, it comes at the
dual cost of a degree of repetition and the lack of any consideration
for the interaction between events on the various fronts.
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As Wright explains, Britain effectively stumbled into its intervention
in Russia’s internecine conflict. The first troops were sent to Russia’s
ports in 1918 to fight Germans rather than Bolsheviks, with the first
British forces even landing in Murmansk at the invitation of the local
soviet. With the collapse of the Imperial German war effort, however,
the focus quickly shifted to aiding the Whites in their efforts to challenge
Bolshevik control. Even before the peace treaty had been signed in
Versailles, companies of men were mustered in Britain specifically for
service in Russia, with demobilised veterans of the trenches enlisting
for the pay and bonuses offered. Soon after their arrival, these recruits
found themselves engaged in small-unit actions against Bolshevik
forces, often in challenging political and environmental conditions.
One of the merits of Wright’s book is his emphasis on the role that
Commonwealth forces, such as the Canadian Malamute Company,
played in the intervention. With their involvement typically noted only
in passing in most British-centric accounts of the intervention, this
has the effect of underscoring not just the multinational composition
of Britain’s effort, but the challenge Britain faced in cobbling together
a force of sufficient size. This ultimately limited the role that British
and Commonwealth units could play in the war. While the soldiers
fought well and scored several victories against Red Army and Navy
units, theirs was always intended to primarily be a holding action
while the Whites organised and trained their own forces to defeat the
Bolsheviks. Yet Wright’s narrative makes clear the doomed nature of
these hopes. Russian recruits for the White forces were often in poor
physical condition and ill-prepared for the rigors of military service.
Even more problematic, though, was the questionable loyalty of the
men. This was true for both sides, as Wright notes the intelligence
supplied by turncoats in the Bolshevik ranks on several occasions
as well as the sometimes egregious inaccuracy of Bolshevik shells
and bombs. Yet such efforts did not prevent the Red Army from
maintaining a military effort, while the British soon discovered that
Whites in Murmansk, Archangel, Siberia, and southern Russia often
could not muster a coherent force in response. By the end of the war,
the British and Commonwealth forces were forced to scuttle donated
vessels and crush planes under the treads of tanks (before driving the
tanks themselves into the sea) prior to their evacuation in order to
deny the equipment to advancing Red Army units.
Such an ignominious end provides a tragic tint to the heroism
Wright details in his book. As a testament to their sacrifices, it
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is an unqualified success as he describes sympathetically but not
uncritically their struggles both on and off the battlefield. But even
with chapters detailing intelligence activities and the experiences
of British and Commonwealth prisoners-of-war held captive by
the Bolsheviks, his book still falls short as a study of the military
intervention overall. While Wright makes effective use of archival
records, private materials, and the secondary literature relating to his
subject, his sources are all from the British and Commonwealth side.
This influences his narrative, as British and Commonwealth officers
and men are identified by name and even provided with service
histories while their opposite numbers are simply faceless Bolsheviks.
While the barrier of language may explain this omission, less excusable
is his lack of any examination of the British policymaking behind
the intervention which could have been provided easily enough by
drawing upon the ample scholarly work that has been done about the
politics and diplomacy of the conflict over the past century.1 In this
respect, the title of Wright’s book does a disservice to his subject;
readers who pick it up expecting an account of Winston Churchill’s
confrontation with Vladimir Lenin will be disappointed as Churchill
himself is mentioned little more than a dozen times in the text and
Lenin even fewer than that. More importantly, the absence of such
coverage deprives the operations the author describes of any context,
which artificially constrains his explanation of the outcome. It places
an unfortunate limitation on Wright’s achievement; while his book
serves well as an account of British military activities in the Russian
Civil War, in the end it provides only one piece of the incredibly
complicated puzzle of Britain’s involvement in it.
mark klobas , scottsdale community college

1  
See, for example, W.P. and Z.K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1945); Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik
Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924 (London: Macmillan,
1979); Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to War
and Revolution, 1913-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); David Carlton,
Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000);
Michael Graham Fry, And Fortune Fled: David Lloyd George, the First Democratic
Statesman, 1916-1922 (New York: Peter Lang, 2011); and the relevant volumes in
the Documents in British Foreign Policy series. Wright does list Richard Ullman’s
three-volume Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1961-72) in his bibliography, but his use of it in his text is minimal at best.
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